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We study community structure in time-dependent legislation cosponsorship networks in the Peruvian
Congress, and we compare them briefly to legislation cosponsorship networks in the United States Sen-
ate. To study these legislatures, we employ a multilayer representation of temporal networks in which
legislators in each layer are connected to each other with a weight that is based on how many bills they
cosponsor. We then use multilayer modularity maximization to detect communities in these networks.
From our computations, we are able to capture power shifts in the Peruvian Congress during 2006–2011.
For example, we observe the emergence of “opportunists”, who switch from one community to another,
as well as cohesive legislative communities whose initial component legislators never change communi-
ties. Interestingly, many of the opportunists belong to the group that won the majority in Congress.
Keywords:
political cosponsorship networks, time-dependent community structure, multilayer networks
1. Introduction
Political networks encompass several types of connectivity — based on social ties, voting similarities,
and other features — and it is important to analyze them to understand political systems [1–4]. In
c© The author 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Institute of Mathematics and its Applications. All rights reserved.
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political science, the availability of public data (sometimes aided by various digital media [5]) pro-
vides a strong and compelling encouragement for quantitative analyses of politics [6]. In addition to
legislative bodies, on which we focus in the present study, numerous types of political networks have
now been investigated quantitatively. These include judiciary systems such as the United States (U.S.)
Supreme Court [7] and the European Court of Justice [8]; international relations [9]; political commu-
nication [10]; lobbying [11]; and political behavior [12].
As with other types of networks, it has thus far been most common to examine political net-
works terms of standard (i.e., “monoplex”) networks, which are represented mathematically as ordi-
nary graphs [13]. The types of legislative networks that have been studied in this way include ones
defined based on committee assignments [14–17], legislation cosponsorship [18–22], party faction [23],
and similarity of voting patterns [5, 24–32]. Ideas from temporal networks [33–35] and multilayer net-
works [36,37] have been incorporated into investigations of some time-dependent [38–40] and multiplex
networks [41] in data from politics and international relations. Investigations of the dynamical restruc-
turing of political bodies have yielded insights into the aggregate tendencies of party polarization and
realignment [24,38,40] and in the study of politically developing (or democratizing) countries [42–45],
and using approaches from temporal and multilayer networks promises to generate further insights in
these applications.
In the present paper, we consider the dynamical restructuring of a legislature in a democratizing
country by examining a time-dependent network of legislators in the Congress of the Republic of
Peru [46]. We construct a multilayer temporal network using bill cosponsorship relationships among
politicians. In our multilayer representation of these temporal networks, the edge weights in each layer
arise from the similarities in cosponsorship patterns during the time window that is associated with the
layer. Because cosponsorship relationships are one of the main types of work allocated to the legislative
branch of the government in Peru, studying them allows us to focus on official activities of politicians
instead of either speculative or scandalous ones (social ties, bribery, etc.). To examine how cohesive
sets of legislators with cosponsorship relationships change over time, we examine time-dependent com-
munity structure [38, 47]. We find a dramatic rearrangement of community structure in the Peruvian
Congress, which we contrast to the relatively stable political bipolarity in the U.S. Senate. For the Peru-
vian Congress, considering a cosponsorship relationship alone does a good job of successfully revealing
the underlying political power rearrangement, and it also appears to deliver more subtle information than
official party membership. We quantify the rearrangement of political groups by examining changes over
time in time-dependent community structure [36, 38]. We then do similar computations for legislation
cosponsorship networks in the U.S. Senate and compare our results to our observations for the Peruvian
Congress.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the data set of Peruvian
legislators, discuss how we use it to construct time-dependent networks, and indicate our methodology
for analyzing these networks. We discuss our results for the Peruvian Congress and U.S. Senate in
Section 3, and we conclude in Section 4.
2. Data set and methods
2.1 Peruvian cosponsorship network data
We manually curated the legislation cosponsorship data for the Peruvian Congress during the years
2006–2011 directly from [46]. During 2006–2011, the Peruvian Congress experienced a significant
amount of restructuring—including the splitting of the majority party (Unio´n por el Peru´; UPP), which
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Fig. 1: Procedure for projecting from a bipartite network to a weighted networks in a given time window.
MAP:questions and comments on the figure: (1) “congressperson”! “legislator” (applies to many
other figs as well); (2) are the edges between legislators and bills undirected? I guess so, since
we’re using bipartite networks, but in the US one has both sponsors and cosponsors, so there is a
directed relationship; does that happen in Peru or not? and if it does happen, we have to say that
we ignore it; (3) it should be “-” and not “–” before the word ’mode’ in the labels
le islator l1
le islator l2 le islator l3
le islator l4
le islator l5
) bipartite network
(b) le islato -mode projection (c) bil -mode ti n
bi l b1 ill b2 bi l b3
le islator l1
le islator l2
le islator l3
legi lator l4
le islator l5
ill b1
ill b2 bi l b3
Fig. 1: Schematic to illustrate a projection from a bipartite network to a weighted network. The edges
are undirected, because we treat all of the main sponsors and their cosponsors equally. (That is, we
ignore the directed nature of such relationships.)
Table 1: Basic statistics for the bipartite cosponsorship networks (BCNs), bill-mode projection networks
(BPNs), and legislator-mode projection networks (LPNs). [TW is the time window, #B is the number of
bills, #L is the number of legislators, #E is the number of edges, and ρ is the edge density.]
TW #B #L #E ; ρ #E ; ρ #E ; ρ
BCN BPN LPN
total 3522 130 27414; 0.0021 1569063; 0.253 7107; 0.848
0607 I 678 120 5251; 0.0645 56411; 0.246 3694; 0.517
0607 II 355 119 2824; 0.0668 18447; 0.294 3723; 0.530
0708 I 469 117 3656; 0.0666 25891; 0.236 2880; 0.424
0708 II 341 119 2629; 0.0648 13418; 0.231 2195; 0.313
0809 I 331 122 2550; 0.0631 12163; 0.223 2227; 0.302
0809 II 243 119 2032; 0.0703 8244; 0.280 3580; 0.510
0910 I 323 116 2394; 0.0639 11644; 0.224 2250; 0.337
0910 II 242 118 1942; 0.0680 7655; 0.263 2498; 0.362
1011 I 379 119 2875; 0.0637 18320; 0.256 2179; 0.310
1011 II 161 116 1261; 0.0675 3612; 0.280 2039; 0.306
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Fig. 2: Cumulative degree distributions P(k) =
∑
k′>k p(k′) of (a) bills (i.e., indicating the number of
cosponsoring legislators) and (b) legislators (i.e., indicating the number of cosponsored bills) in the
bipartite cosponsorship network (BCN) for each half-year.
was representing the “opposition” to the government1, and the reorganization of legislators from the
minority parties into different legislative groups2. There were 7 parties/groups at the beginning of the
2006–2011 Congress, 14 groups were formed during that period (though not all were present at one
time), and there were 9 political groups and 3 legislators without a group affiliation at the end of the
Congress in 2011 [48].
A legislative year starts on 27 July every year, so we use “I” to the denote bills between that date and
the last day of December and “II” to denote bills between January and before the beginning of the next
legislative year3. Therefore, 0607 I occurs in the second half of the year 2006, 0607 II occurs during
the first half of the year 2007, and so on. A cosponsorship relation occurs between a legislator and a bill,
so each half-year constitutes a bipartite (i.e., two-mode) network. As we illustrate in Fig. 1(a), if bill
b1 is cosponsored by legislators l1, l2, and l3, then bill b1 is adjacent to l1, l2, and l3 via an undirected
edge. For simplicity, we do not distinguish between the main sponsor of a bill and his/her cosponsors,
so everyone who participates in sponsoring a bill is adjacent to the bill (i.e., we ignore the directed
nature of these edges, as in Ref. [20]). Of course, two bills can share legislators [such as legislator l3
for bills b1 and b2 in Fig. 1(a)], and two legislators can cosponsor multiple bills (such as legislators l4
and l5, who cosponsor bills b2 and b3). Such overlapping relationships are important for “projections”
of a bipartite cosponsorship network (BCN) [see Figs. 1(b) and 1(c)]. Because we are interested in
the relationships among the politicians, we use these networks to construct unipartite (i.e., one-mode)
networks among legislators [see Fig. 1(b)]. The projection throws away some information [14, 15,
49, 50], but we nevertheless consider such legislator-mode projections as our primary type of network
1In Peru, it is customary that the losing party in the presidential election considers itself to be the “opposition” in Congress
as a declaration that it is watching the government to make sure that it remains accountable and is not abusing its constitutional
powers.
2It is important to distinguish the terms “party” and “group” in Peruvian politics. A party competes in an election, whereas a
group is created in Congress. Naturally, there is a very strong correspondence between parties and groups.
3This nomenclature helps facilitate understanding of the temporal organization of the bill proposals, but it need not correspond
to official legislative sessions, as the official beginnings and endings of sessions can be reduced or extended if the Congress
decides to do so. Proposals can be presented during extraordinary sessions, but the webpage of the Congress (whence the data
was scraped) does not indicate whether any proposals were presented during an extraordinary session in 2006–2011.
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among legislators.
In Fig. 1, we illustrate our procedure to “project” from a BCN to weighted, unipartite bill and leg-
islator networks. In the former, a weighted edge indicates the number of cosponsoring legislators that
two bills have in common; in the latter, a weighted edge indicates the number of bills that a pair of
legislators both cosponsored. We also remove self-edges from the unipartite networks. In Table 1, we
show some summary statistics for each of the ten periods (0607 I, 0607 II, 0708 I, 0708 II, 0809 I,
0809 II, 0910 I, 0910 II, 1011 I, and 1011 II). As a basic network statistic, for each bipartite network,
we show the degree distributions of bills and legislators in Fig. 2. Observe that the number of legislators
who cosponsor bills is distributed much more heterogeneously compared to the number of bills that
individual legislators cosponsor. A similar result was reported for legislation cosponsorship networks
in the U.S. [19]. From now on, we examine the weighted unipartite networks between legislators [see
Fig. 1(b)]. To obtain deeper insights than what we can see from the basic calculations in Fig. 1 (and to
illustrate a fascinating difference between the Peruvian and U.S. legislatures), we will examine multi-
layer community structure across the ten legislative sessions. In particular, this will allow us to explore
how coherent, densely-connected sets of legislators change from 2006 to 2011.
By partitioning the bills into ten consecutive periods, we obtain a temporal network of cosponsorship
relations. The weighted legislator-mode projection networks for different periods all include most legis-
lators (though some legislators are “invisible” during a specific period due to their absence in cosponsor-
ing activities). There are 130 legislators4 in total, and we examine the temporally changing relations in
legislation cosponsorship over the ten periods. We construct a multilayer representation [36, 38] of the
temporal network from the ten consecutive periods. A legislator in a given period is a single node-layer,
so each legislator has ten corresponding node-layers. To study community structure, we will partition
the multilayer network, which is composed of the node-layers and the edges between them, into disjoint
communities.
2.2 Multilayer community detection
Reference [38] introduced a method for time-dependent community detection by deriving and maximiz-
ing a multilayer generalization of the modularity objective function:
Q =
1
2µ
∑
i jsr
[(
Ai js−γs
ki,sk j,s
2ms
)
δ(s,r) +δ(i, j)C jsr
]
δ
(
gi,s,g j,r
)
, (2.1)
where i and j are legislators, s and r (where s,r ∈ {1, . . . ,T }, and we divide time into T nonoverlapping
windows) are layers (i.e., periods, which consist of half-years), δ is the Kronecker delta, and gi,s is the
community to which legislator i is assigned in layer s (so δ(gi,s,g j,r) = 1 if node i in layer s and node j in
layer r belong the same community). The adjacency-tensor element Ai js gives the number of bills that
legislators i and j cosponsor in period s. Thus, Ai js = 0 if i and j do not cosponsor a single bill, and we
take Aiis = 0 for every i to remove self-edges. Additionally, ki,s is the strength of node i (i.e., the sum of
the weights of the intralayer edges attached to node i) in layer s, the quantity ms =
∑
i j Ai js/2 is the sum
of the weights in layer s, and γs is the resolution parameter in layer s. The quantity C jsr , 0 if node-
layer ( j, s) is adjacent to node-layer ( j,r) (i.e., legislator j is connected to him/herself across different
periods), and C jsr = 0 otherwise. We assume so-called “diagonal” coupling [36], so nonzero interlayer
coupling cannot occur between different legislators. We use the factor 2µ =
∑
i js Ai js +
∑
jsr C jsr to
4The 2006–2011 Peruvian Congress had 120 seats, but an additional 10 legislators were part of this Congress because some
legislators died or were expelled.
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Fig. 3: Summary statistics for time-dependent community detection in the multilayer legislation cospon-
sorship network in the 2006–2011 Peruvian Congress. Logarithm of (a) maximum modularity (using
a variant [53] of the Louvain method) and (b) the mean normalized flexibility 〈 fi〉/(T − 1), where the
flexibility fi for node i is defined in Eq. (3.1), T is the total number of layers, and 〈· · · 〉 denotes the mean
over all nodes. Flexibility depends on both the interlayer coupling strength (i.e., interlayer resolution
parameter) ω and the intralayer resolution parameter γ.
normalize Q ∈ [−1,1]. See [51] for recent theoretical work on multilayer modularity maximization.
When a legislator does not appear in some period, all intralayer and interlayer edges attached to his/her
associated node-layer have a value of 0.
We simplify the interlayer connections further by taking C jsr = ω if two consecutive layers s and r
share legislator j and C jrs = 0 otherwise. Hence, interlayer edges occur only between consecutive layers,
the interlayer coupling is “ordinal” [36], and it is uniform across legislators. By also taking γs = γ for all
layers, we are left with an “intralayer resolution parameter” γ to go along with the ‘interlayer resolution
parameter’ ω [52]. As in one of the approaches in Ref. [38], we use a variant [53] of the Louvain
method [54] to maximize Q.
3. Results
3.1 Measuring switches in political allegiances
Motivated by the work in [55], we define the “flexibility” fi of legislator i to be the number of times that
he/she changes community membership during the observation time in the multilayer network. That is,
fi =
T−1∑
s=1
[
1−δ (gi,s,gi,s+1)] , (3.1)
where we recall that gi,r indicates the community assignment of legislator i in layer r ∈ {1, . . . ,T }. The
term “flexibility” was used in [55] in a study of functional brain networks, and we adopt it for the present
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Fig. 4: Time-dependent community structure for the multilayer legislation cosponsorship network
in the 2006–2011 Peruvian Congress for (a) (γ,ω) = (1.0,20.0) (with 7 total communities) and (b)
(γ,ω) = (1.0,60.0) (with 6 total communities). We show different communities using different colors
and symbols, and we sort the legislators by political party (i.e., the parties for which they were can-
didates), which we sort alphabetically from left to right and separate with vertical lines. The political
parties are Alianza por el Futuro, Frente del Centro, Partido Asprista Peruano, Peru´ Posible, Restau-
racio´n Nacional, Unidad Nacional, and Unio´n por el Peru´.
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Fig. 5: Time-dependent community structure for the multilayer legislation cosponsorship network
in the 2006–2011 Peruvian Congress for (a) (γ,ω) = (1.5,20.0) (with 9 total communities) and (b)
(γ,ω) = (1.5,60.0) (with 8 total communities). We show different communities using different colors
and symbols, and we sort the legislators by political party, which we sort alphabetically from left to right
and separate with vertical lines.The political parties are Alianza por el Futuro, Frente del Centro, Partido
Asprista Peruano, Peru´ Posible, Restauracio´n Nacional, Unidad Nacional, and Unio´n por el Peru´.
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Fig. 6: Time-dependent community structure for the legislation cosponsorship network in Congresses
93–110 of the U.S. Senate for (a) (γ,ω) = (1.0,20.0) and (b) (γ,ω) = (1.0,60.0). In each case, there are
2 communities in total. We show different communities using different colors and symbols, and we sort
the Senators by political party, which we separate with vertical lines. From left to right, the parties are
the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, independents (Harry F. Byrd Jr. and James M. Jeffords),
and the Conservative Party of New York State (James L. Buckley).
paper. A complementary concept is network “persistence,” which was defined in Ref. [51] as
T−1∑
s=1
N∑
i=1
δ(gi,s,gi,s+1) , (3.2)
where N is the number of entities (e.g., legislators) in a multilayer network.
In Fig. 3, we show the maximum modularity and mean flexibility 〈 fi〉 for the temporal multilayer
legislator-projected network from multilayer modularity maximization [38] using a variant [53] of the
Louvain method [54]. The flexibility results in Fig. 3(b) suggest that there is a nontrivial relationship
between flexibility values and the parameters γ and ω, so it is helpful to explore these results further
for several values of (γ,ω). In this paper, we present results for four parameter combinations: (γ,ω) =
(1.0,20.0), (1.0,60.0), (1.5,20.0), and (1.5,60.0). Although the two values of the interlayer coupling
strength ω seem large in comparison to those in previous works [38, 52], we wish to use values that are
comparable to intralayer coupling strengths (i.e., the intralayer edge weights), which we take to be the
numbers of cosponsored bills. With these computations, we are able to illuminate interesting political
structures in the Peruvian Congress and to subsequently contrast them with community structure in the
U.S. Senate. In Figs. 4 and 5, we illustrate time-dependent community structure for several values of
(γ,ω). Larger values of γ capture smaller communities (and a larger number of communities), and larger
values of ω capture more temporally coherent communities (as expected) [38]. We then perform similar
computations for U.S. Senate cosponsorship networks. We downloaded the U.S. Senate data from [56].
These data start from the 93rd Congress (which covers the dates 3 January 1973–3 January 1975) and
go through the 110th Congress (which covers the dates 3 January 2007–3 January 2009). We construct a
multilayer U.S. Senate cosponsorship network using the same procedure (see Fig. 1) as for the Peruvian
Congress, except that each time window in the former covers an entire 2-year Congress (in contrast to a
half-year for Peru). We also use the same values of the resolution parameters γ and ω.
With our calculations, we demonstrate that multilayer modularity maximization can yield insight
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about time-dependent community structure in real political cosponsorship data, and the adjustable
intralayer resolution parameter and interlayer coupling allow one to explore structure at multiple scales.
We now compare results from our two data sets, and we interpret our results on the Peruvian Congress
in more detail in Section 3.2.
We illustrate time-dependent community structure for the U.S. Senate in Fig. 6). Unsurprisingly,
we observe a relatively stable bipolar structure (Democrats versus Republicans) in the U.S. Senate,
which contrasts sharply with the more intricate temporal community structure in the Peruvian Congress.
Although the observation periods — 5 years versus 36 years for the whole duration, and one half-year
versus two years for each layer — for the two legislatures are different (which is a very important
issue to consider in our comparison of the two legislatures), we stress that it is the shorter of the two
that experiences much more dramatic changes in community structure, further emphasizing the sharp
contract in community-structure dynamics in these two countries. For instance, Unidad Nacional (UN),
which was composed of four parties, dissolved in 2008 [57] after eight years of political alliance. This
could help explain the restructuring of its year-2007 members that we observe in Figs. 4(a) and 5(a,b).
Figures 4 and 5 also highlight the loyalty of politicians in the Partido Aprista Peruano (PAP) and
the Fujimori Group; none of their members left those groups to join another group. By contrast, the
party Unio´n por el Peru´ (UPP), which started the 0607 I Congress (in July 2006) with a majority of the
seats (45 seats out of 120), lost members to other groups in Congress. By the end of the 1011 II session
in 2011, UPP had only 7 remaining members [58]. Figures 5 and (especially) Figure 4 illustrate the
switching of the UPP legislators to other parties. We discuss such political reorganizations further in
Section 3.2.
3.2 Dynamical reorganization of the Peruvian Congress
To discuss time-dependent community structure in the Peruvian Congress in more detail, we need to
give some context about the legislators and the Peruvian political system.
• A legislator must obtain support from at least five other legislators to present a bill proposal. Each
legislator represents one Region (similar to a U.S. State) in Peru, and each Region can have one or
more legislators from one or more parties. Lima, the capital of Peru, has 30% of all seats [59]. A
legislator needs to be part of a political group that includes at least six legislators to be represented
on the Congress Board5.
• The Peruvian Congress has only one chamber. In 2006, 25 parties competed for 120 seats, and
7 parties won at least one seat [61]. The party (PAP) of the President of the executive branch
did not obtain a majority (it won 36 seats) in Congress, and the party (UPP) of the runner-up
for President won the largest number of seats (45 seats). PAP is a traditional and longstanding
party (almost 90 years old) and UPP was composed primarily of new regional leaders and popular
figures (from outside the political arena)6. At the beginning of the 2006–2011 Congress, it was
not clear whether UPP would be able to remain cohesive and gain more support from the minority
5According to the norms of the Congress, available at [60], the Congress Board is in charge of conducting the discussion of
proposals, the discussion of voting, and the meetings in which proposals are scheduled. The president of the Congress Board
appoints all high-level staff in Congress, and the Congress Board is the body that most influences the Congress’s budget.
6UPP was founded in 1994. After losing against President Alberto Fujimori in 1995, UPP was a weak political party, but it
remained eligible to compete in future elections. In the 2006 election, a popular candidate (Ollanta Humala) was invited to be the
UPP candidate. See [62] for further historical details.
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groups to control the Congress or if the traditional cohesiveness of PAP’s legislators would play
in PAP’s favor and allow them to keep control of Congress.
The winning party (PAP) in the executive branch garnered the second-largest number of seats (with
9 fewer than the majority) and kept control of the Congress. They presided over every Congress Board,
and they never lost their internal cohesion, as none of their members abandoned the party to join another
group. By contrast, UPP and other parties lost legislators to other political groups or founded new
groups. Among the 45 legislators that UPP had in 2006, only 7 remained in 2011 [48]. Figures 5
captures reorganizations in the political parties. For instance, we observe opportunistic behavior of
legislators who tend to strengthen ties outside their original community. This seems to have occurred
not only among legislators whose original party had a small share in Congress but also to members of
the majority party (UPP), which included many of the most flexible legislators. Eight legislators were
members of at least three different groups; seven of these legislators were from UPP7, and one legislator
(Wilson Michael Urtecho Medina) was from the UN. By examining time-dependent community struc-
ture, one can also see the emergence of new groups (e.g., Partido Demo´crata Peruano, which included
Carlos Torres Caro, Gustavo Espinoza, and Rocı´o Gonza´lez from the UPP). One can also observe the
cohesiveness in PAP and the Fujimori group (i.e., Alianza por el Futuro).
Legislators from UPP were not the only ones who were switching to other groups. Moreover, the
switching behavior of legislators may have been reinforced when UN, which originally had 17 seats,
ceased to be an alliance in 2008. The legislators from Solidaridad Nacional (SN), one of the parties in
the UN alliance, formed a new group during the second half of the 2006–2011 Congress (when the 2011
presidential elections were in sight) 8. Officially, however, UPP supported SN in the 2011 election [63].
We check for geographical correlations with our observations by comparing individual legislators’
district location to their flexibility [see Eq. (3.1)], which indicates how often they change community
assignment. In Fig. 7, we plot individual legislators’ flexibility values on top of their district locations
on a map of Peru, and we observe that the central part of the country (including the capital city Lima)
tends to have more flexible legislators. We list some notably flexible legislators in Table 2.
Our discussions above suggest that Peruvian legislators need to be strategic to maximize his/her
political opportunities. For example, they can either take a “loyalist” or an “opportunist” strategy. In the
latter strategy, a politician moves to what appears to be a more promising group or party for their political
future. Moreover, one can examine the loyalty level of parties based on how many legislators remain
with them over time. For example, during the 2006–2011 Congress, PAP and the Fujimori group kept
all of their members. Additionally, as we have seen above, having a significant presence in the Peruvian
Congress is not sufficient to ensure loyalty: UPP had the majority but lost several legislators to other
groups. Such strategic behavior can result from several possible causes:
• The number of legislators that are needed to found a group is six, which can encourage members
of parties with fewer than six seats to switch to other groups (even to ones with a rather different
political ‘ideology’ or ‘identity’).
• There is a current trend of low reelection rates in the Peruvian Congress, so as an election draws
near, legislators may need to develop a strategy to distance themselves from parties that become
unpopular and associate more closely with groups that become popular.
7These legislators were Gloria Deniz Ramos Prudencio, Washington Zeballos Go´mez, Isaac Mekler Neiman, Alvaro Gonzalo
Gutierrez Cueva, Antonio Leo´n Zapata, Jose Saldan˜a Tovar, and Rosa Marı´a Venegas Mello.
8The leader of SN, who at that time was the Mayor of Lima (Peru’s city capital), aspired to become President in 2011. Mean-
while, other parties in the UN had their own plans for the 2011 Presidential elections.
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• Another current trend is for party leaders to invite popular figures to their Congressional roster.
This may affect the cohesiveness of a party.
By 2011, twelve legislators were in a different party than the one to which they were associated
during the 2006 elections. Only one of them was reelected in the 2011 election. Nine of the twelve
were not from Lima, and none of those nine were reelected. Although party switching is considered to
be an effective strategy for short-term gain, the very low reelection rate in the last three Congressional
elections (2001, 2006, 2011) may also suggest that it is not an effective long-term strategy. To investigate
such a hypothesis, it will be important to compare the Peruvian Congress to Congresses in other nations.
In contrast to party switching in the Peruvian legislature, U.S. Senators have much firmer community
memberships, and their flexibility does not seem to include as many geographic characteristics. We
show their flexibilities on a map of the U.S. in Fig. 8, and we again observe a bipolar structure among
the U.S. Senators. We list some notably flexible Senators in Table 3. The list depends sensitively on the
value of the intralayer resolution parameter γ (e.g., it consists mostly of Republicans for some parameter
values but not for Democrats for others), in contrast to our observations for the Peruvian Congress. We
also recall that using different values of resolution parameters can be helpful for investigating different
structural features (e.g., ones with different sizes) in networks [47, 52].
4. Conclusions and discussion
We examined time-dependent community structure to explore dynamical restructuring in the Peruvian
Congress in the 2006–2011 session by studying networks constructed from (publicly available) legis-
lation cosponsorship data. Our computations give a lens with which to view the frequent switches in
the political group affiliations of legislators in Peru, and our investigation illustrates a dissolution of the
majority party at the beginning of 2006 Peruvian Congress. We contrasted these Peruvian politics with
the political climate in the U.S., in which there are two highly polarized political parties.
From a more general standpoint, our calculations indicate that even cosponsorship data alone is able
to reveal political restructuring in legislative bodies. For countries, such as Peru, in which democratic
institutions are still immature,9 it should be very insightful to use quantitative methods such as network
analysis to analyze political restructuring during the maturation process of governmental bodies.
As more data become available amidst the modern data deluge, it will be possible to conduct fur-
ther investigations to elucidate both political and social network structures among legislators. Future
research can include focusing on bills rather than politicians, studying change points in the temporal
dynamics [68], examining the role of overlapping communities, pursuing case studies in other coun-
tries, and more. It is interesting to examine the relationship between public labels such as party mem-
bership and quantities (such as flexibility) that one can measure from procedures like time-dependent
community detection using (publicly available) legislation cosponsorship data. Ideally, one can use
dynamic network analysis to reveal insights that complement those from more traditional techniques
(e.g., statistical analyses) in quantitative and qualitative political science.
9Since declaring its independence from Spain in 1821, Peru has had many periods of both democracy and military dictator-
ships. The current democracy in Peru was reinstated in 1980 after 12 years of military dictatorship, although some scholars have
interpreted the government of President Fujimori (1990–2000) as a kind of dictatorship [66, 67].
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